לדיון בסוגיית נישואי התערובת

Despite my position that in principle it is necessary to assess what ought to be included and what should be excluded, there can be no justification for a state to restrict intermarriage – this would be tantamount to denying rights, which is scandalous. The various communities may encourage or condemn such acts but the state has no right to restrict the rights of the individual to such an extent.

Link to the statements by Prof. Alon Harel

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What we have today is secular forces that are trying to move beyond the world of the individual and shape a new politics. The problem is that like any new thing there is great confusion/embarrassment (Udi choose which is meant by מבוכה here). Ostensibly, this embarrassment/confusion can be understood as follows: to ask to get married without a rabbi, but by a clerk, is like asking to be circumcised by a doctor, not by a Mohel (and not for reasons of health). This is a demand to replace the rabbi by the state, and gives the state access to the community allowing the state to invade it. This is, of course, only an analogy and in important ways is simplified.

The historical reasons for instituting religious marriage as the only option

The source of the current system governing marriage and divorce in Israel is the Ottoman law (the “Millet system”), which was continued by the British Mandate and adopted by the State of Israel upon its establishment. According to this system, when it comes to matters of marriage and divorce, every resident of the State of Israel is governed by his/her respective religious laws and religious institutions.

In the early nineteen fifties, when Israel’s Rabbinical Court Jurisdiction (marriage and divorce) Law was passed (which applied personal status law to Jewish marriage and divorce), it was considered an appropriate compromise between different approaches within the Jewish public and a critical step in averting a rift within the Jewish people, as well as a means to prevent Jews from marrying people from other faiths. In addition, the practical difficulties that resulted from the passing of this law was limited: the number of people who could not marry under religious law was small and various ways to deal with the resulting practical and ideological difficulties were found.

In the past few decades, various proposals to change the status quo have been rejected. Primary justifications for rejecting these proposals include: concerns for an increase in cases of bastardy, the need to safeguard the Jewish character of the state as it was defined in the “status quo”, strengthening cohesion and unity between various Jewish groups and the need to prevent intermarriage.

For a more detailed discussion see position paper, p.19.

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The right to marry

The status of the right to marry as a fundamental right is derived from international conventions to which Israel is a signatory and rulings by the High Court of Justice.

However, the fact that marriage and divorce are exclusively governed by religious law means that the citizens of Israel face many restrictions when they wish to realize their right to marry: restrictions relating to the identity of the potential spouse, denial of interfaith marriages, the fact that non orthodox rituals are not recognized, structural inequality which does not favor women in marriage and divorce, and more.

For the full discussion see: Ruth Gavison, position paper (on p.38), Aharon Barak.

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Article 23 in the international Covenant on Civil and Political Rights mainly focuses on the protection of the rights of the couple to freedom and equality within a marriage. States which have signed the covenant can put in place different arrangements in the area of family law, but these must conform to the constraints dictated by human rights. The state does not have the authority to infringe human rights or supersede them regardless of the type of regime in place or the religious and ethnic identity of the couple.

Israel has signed and ratified the covenant, but tendered its reservation regarding article 23 because the religious monopoly that exists in Israel in the area of marriage and divorce imposes restrictions on the freedom and equality of the couple who which to marry (or divorce).

On the other hand – the first clause in this article is about the “family group unit’s” right to protection – this right places an obligation on society and the state. In light of society’s obligation to safeguard the institution of the family, a question arises whether it ought to also protect the family from the couple?

Another question that arises in this context is what is the status of the individual’s right to a family when weighed against the rights of distinct communities to preserve their culture (which may find unique expression particularly in the ways in which families are defined and delineated)? It seems there is tension between the rights of individuals to build a family and the rights held by the civil society amongst which the family lives. There is also a tension between individuals’ right to a family and collective right of cultural communities – to which the couple belong – to preserve their unique character.

For an expanded discussion see: Ruth Gavison

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Freedom of Religion

The right to freedom of religion is founded in, among other things, Israel’s Declaration of Independence and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In the area of marriage and divorce this means that every human being has the right to choose between different religious rituals, alongside the right to marry in a ceremony completely devoid of any religious aspect.

The law in Israel stands in conflict with this principle because it allows for marriage only according to the religious law of the community to which the couple belongs, and does not allow for a choice between different rituals or between alternative rituals within the same religion.

For an expanded discussion see: Daniel Statman, position paper (p.41)

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The right to equality

The right to equality as a fundamental right is founded in the international conventions to which Israel is a signatory and in the rulings of Israel’s Supreme Court.

The exclusive jurisdiction given to religious law over matters of marriage and divorce in Israel infringes the principle of equality on several counts: significant gender gaps, infringements of the rights of the couple during marriage and upon leaving the framework of marriage, lack of equality between the various religious texts – those recognized by the state and those which are not, non recognition of the right of people belonging to different religions and same sex couples to marry.

For an expanded discussion: position paper (p.42), Ruth Gavison

הרצון להנהיג נישואים אזרחיים בישראל מתפרש כרצון לפתור בעיות של הפרט על חשבון הכלל. העיקרון היסודי שהנחה את מנהיגי המדינה בראשיתה, שטובת הכלל גדולה יותר מטובת הפרט ואף חשובה יותר, יתנפץ עם הנהגת נישואים אזרחיים. יחסי היחיד והציבור ישתנו מאחריות הפרט לכלל, כלומר לעם, למצב שבו אין לפגוע ביחיד גם אם הכלל כולו נפגע מכך..

בעקבות הנהגת נישואים על פי ההלכה, ישנם בני זוג שאינם יכולים לבוא בברית הנישואים, והם כמובן נפגעים מכך. עם כל הצער והכאב המובנים, מצבם של בני זוג כאלו דומה למצבם של בני זוג העומדים להינשא, ומתגלה במהלך בדיקות גנטיות כי הילדים שייוולדו להם יסבלו בוודאות ממומים קשים. הם בוודאי יבחרו בצער רב שלא לממש את אהבתם, מתוך אחריות לצאציהם.
במשך כל הדורות היו קבוצות בעם ישראל שחיפשו דרכים לשנות את ההלכה, כגון הצדוקים והקראים. הקבוצות הללו נדחו על ידי העם בחושו הבריא והאחראי לקיומו הנצחי.
המשך קיומו, אחדותו וטהרתו ושל עם ישראל והיוחסין שנשמרו בקפידה במשך אלפי שנים ואם כוונתם של המציעים היא להביא לשינוי ייחודו של עם ישראל ולהפוך אותו להיות ככל הגויים, עליהם לומר זאת בפירוש ובגלוי, ולא להתכסות בטיעונים של זכויות הפרט.

למאמר המלא.

Severe and pervasive infringements of human rights in the service of important cultural goals cannot be justified.

In accordance with this, even if religion’s monopoly over marriage and divorce contributes to the Jewish character of the state, one cannot justify the pervasive violation of human rights that it entails, and it must be changed.

For an expanded discussion see: position paper, p.44

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לב הבעיה הוא בכך שהדין הדתי הנוהג עשוי למנוע מזוגות שהיו מעוניינים בנישואין מללכת בדרך זו, ומאלץ אותם לחיות כידועים בציבור (כגון: זוגות בני דתות שונות ופסולי חיתון. לכל הפחות, עבור זוגות אלו הבחירה במוסד הידועים בציבור נובעת מאילוץ ואיננה משקפת הכרעה אוטונומית, ולפיכך איננה משקפת הסדר לגיטימי.

The family is an essential cultural component of Jewish identity. A Jewish state is obligated to uphold age-old traditions and, therefore, must only recognize a marriage that is sanctioned by Jewish Law (Halacha). There is no option of recognizing marriage in any other way, but we can accept the idea of a couple’s partnership as a private legal entity.

For an expanded discussion

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דווקא שימור המצב הקיים יוצר פילוג גדול בעם  היהודי. היעדר ההכרה בזרמים יהודיים שאינם אורתודוקסיים גורם לניכור וריחוק של מיליוני יהודים (בארץ ובתפוצות) לישראל ולממסד הרבני.

להרחבה- עמ' 22 בנייר העמדה

An existential concern for the future and unity of the Jewish people justify infringements of individual rights to a certain extent.

For an expanded discussion see: Shlomo Avineri, Rabbi David Stav (from 0:51)

For a discussion of the threat of disunity amongst the Jewish people

The importance of human rights is derived from both democratic and Jewish principles. Hence, the pervasive infringements of these rights justify changing the current system, from both a democratic and Jewish point-of-view. For an expanded discussion see p.38 in the position paper.

We must ensure that in matters relating to marriage and divorce human rights are protected. We can achieve this through interpreting the spirit of Jewish law (Halacha) in a way that embodies a democratic approach.

For this purpose I have developed a model called “acknowledge, distinguish and derive”. According to this model, one must acknowledge the fact that human rights have been violated, distinguish between civil law and Jewish law, and derive inspiration and guidance for resolving the conflict from Jewish tradition. This model has been put to use in two court rulings, which I mention.

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למרות שאני סבורה שיש צורך לפתוח מסגרת אזרחית רחבה שתאפשר מגוון רחב של מסלולים , אני מסכימה שמסגרת זו איננה צריכה להיות מוגדרת כנישואין וזאת כדי למנוע את הפגיעה בתפיסה המסורתית של מושג הנישואין.

לצפייה.

A unique religious track alongside an official civil alternative > Although I think there is a need to develop a uniform civil framework, perhaps, in order to avoid undermining the traditional notion of the marriage, this framework does not need to be defined as marriage.

A unique religious track/option alongside an official civil alternative

We must maintain a recognition of religious marriage as the only principal route to marriage in this state. In addition, we must offer a civil alternative for registering a couple, called “matrimonial partnership”, which would be available to couples who cannot or do not want to get married according to religious law.

Positions by: Shahar Lifshitz, Rabbi Yisrael Rosen, Rabbi Yuval Cherlow

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A uniform civil framework

In fact, a broad civil framework could yield a wider and more varied expression of Jewish identity in that it recognizes different forms of Jewish expression in rituals even when these are not strictly Orthodox. These would include a variety of Jewish revival movements such as Reform, Conservative and even secular rituals which would draw on traditional elements in an atmosphere of freedom and an absence of coercion. This would facilitate greater identification with Jewish tradition.